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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago the Carter Commission recommended1
integration of the Canadian individual and corporate income taxes.
Although modest initial programmes of integration were proposed by

1 Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report, vol. 4 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966)
(Chair K. LeM. Carter).
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the U.S. Treasury in 19842 and adopted by the U.S. House of
Representatives in 1985,3 the final version of the massive Tax
Reform Act of 1986 did not include any steps in that direction. In
other respects, however, the 1986 legislation profoundly affected the
relationship between corporate and individual American income
taxes, most likely requiring significant further changes in the Internal
Revenue Code.
This paper examines the current situation in the United
States in three parts. Part I begins by briefly reviewing the principal
conceptual models for taxing corporate income. Part II analyzes in
detail the impact of the 1986 legislation on the relationship of
individual and corporate income taxes in the United States. Finally,
Part III briefly suggests possible directions for future legislation and
the continuing relevance of the Carter Commission recommendations.
II. TAXING DISTRIBUTIONS OF CORPORATE INCOME
A. Current Conceptual Models
There are six major models of corporate income taxation that
have received recent attention in the United States: (1) HaigSimons accrual taxation, (2) current taxation of corporate earnings
to shareholders, (3) classical double taxation of dividends, (4) Carter
Commission integration, (5) cash flow taxation, and (6) an intermediate proposal developed by the American Law Institute's Federal
Income Tax Project.
1. Haig-Simons accrual taxation
Under the most widely accepted definition of income, a
model income tax would tax individuals on changes in the value of

2 United States Treasury Department, Tax Reform for Fairness,Simplicity, and Economic

Growth vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Treasury Dept., 1984) at 134-44 [hereinafter Treasuy
Ta Reform Study].
3 H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 311 (partial deduction for dividends paid).
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their assets, including shares of corporate stock.4 Such accrual
taxation would reflect in the individual income tax base income
earned by corporations resulting in increased stock values. Although
implementation of such a regime for at least publicly-traded shares
has long been discussed,5 concerns about liquidity and valuation have
kept such proposals from gaining wide acceptance. The rationale
for adopting such a regime would be that the income tax should
reflect changes in the wealth of individuals as accurately as possible,
and that corporations do not possess independent tax-paying
capacity.
2. Current taxation of corporate income to shareholders
In lieu of taxing shareholders currently on increases in the
value of their shares, corporations could continue to compute
income, which would be attributed to shareholders and taxed in the
year earned. Partnerships have long been pass-through entities
under U.S. tax law,6 and corporations can elect such treatment if7
they are closely-held and have relatively simple capital structures.
Pass-through status for all corporations has generally been rejected
on the grounds that it would be too difficult to attribute corporate
earnings in complicated capital structures and that it would be unfair
to tax shareholders who did not receive distributions of corporate
earnings.

The classic formulation of what is generally referred to as the Haig-Simons definition
of income is by Henry Simons:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.

H. Simons, PersonalIncome Taxation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938) at 50.
5 See, for example, D. Slawson, 'Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly
Held Stock" (1967) 76 Yale L.J. 623; D.J. Shakow, 'Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal

for Accrual Taxation" (1986) 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111; B. Wolfman, "Subchapter C and the
100th Congress" (1986) 33 Tax Notes 669 at 673-74.
6 U.S. Internal Revenue Code 26 USCS §§ 701-761 [hereinafter

IRC].

7 IRC, ibid §§ 1361-379. Electing corporations are generally known as "subchapter S
corporations" after the applicable portion of the Internal Revenue Code.
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3. Classical double taxation of dividends
The model that is usually said to characterize the traditional
U.S. regime is the "classical" system, under which corporations are
taxed as income is earned by the entity, and shareholders are also
taxed when that income is distributed in the form of dividends.
Hence the return on corporate equity capital is said to be subject to
a "double" tax. This characterization does not apply to the return
on corporate capital provided in the form of debt or leased
property, because interest and rent payments are deductible by the
paying corporation. The rationale for this regime is that whatever
the ultimate incidence of the corporate tax is, corporate income, as
defined by the return to equity capital, should bear a tax burden in
addition to the burden imposed on capital income generally,
perhaps
8
as a fee for the benefits of operating in corporate form.
4. Integration of the individual and corporate income taxes
The fourth model of corporate taxation eliminates the double
burden of the classical system, by means of either a corporate
deduction for dividends paid or a shareholder credit for corporate
taxes paid.9 The Carter Commission developed a sophisticated
version of shareholder credit integration that was intended to retain
for Canada a tax on corporate income flowing to foreign investors
from Canadian enterprises.10 The rationale for adopting an
integrated regime was that the corporate income tax should function
as a withholding mechanism for an individual income tax collected
on a realization, rather than an accrual, basis.
The Carter Commission's innovative suggestions included
setting the corporate tax rate equal to the highest individual rate
and allowing deemed distributions in a shareholder-credit system of

8 See R. Good, The CorporationIncome Tax (New York: Wiley, 1951) at 26-40.

9 See C.E. McLure, Jr., Must CorporateIncome Be Taxed Twice? (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1979); A-C. Warren, Jr., 'The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate

Income Taxes (1981) 94 Harv. L Rev. 717.
10 CarterCommission Report, supra, note 1 at 49-70.
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integration. Because it would generally be in the shareholders'
interest for corporations to deem the corporate earnings distributed
each year in order to make available refunds due to the shareholder
credit, such a system could ultimately bring about current
shareholder taxation of corporate income, as described above.
5. Cash flow taxation
In recent years there has been renewed interest in a regime
under which corporations would deduct not only current business
expenses, but also capital costs, such as the cost of machinery and
equipment.'1 Such a tax would be a corporate correlative of a
personal consumption tax,12 would continue to collect taxes on
income produced by assets already in corporate solution, and would
allow the government to share in the excess of the return on future
corporate assets over the rate of interest on government borrowing.
This last function of a corporate cash flow tax can be
illustrated with an example. Suppose the Treasury could borrow at
an annual interest rate of 10 percent. Deductible corporate
investment of $200 would require the government to forgo $100 of
revenue as a result of the deduction if the corporate tax rate were
50 percent, increasing government borrowing by $100. If, after a
year, the corporate investment were liquidated in exchange for $300,
the Treasury's share would be $150, of which it would retain $40
after repaying its $100 of borrowing plus $10 in interest. As a
result, the Treasury would have shared in the excess of corporate
profits over the relatively riskless rate of return on government
borrowing. Canadian scholars have demonstrated how this profit-

11

For example, Institute for Fiscal Studies, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation

(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978) (Chair J.E. Meade) at 228-45 [hereinafter Meade
Committee Report]; R.W. Boadway, N. Bruce & J.M. Mintz, "Corporate Taxation in Canada:
Toward an Efficient System" in W.R. Thirsk & J. Whalley, eds Tax Policy Options in the
1980s (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1982).
12

A personal consumption tax would reach only the consumption portion of the Simons
definition of income set forth in note 4, supra, and could be levied on a cash-flow basis. For
differing views regarding implementation of such a tax, see W.D. Andrews, "A ConsumptionType or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax'

(1974) Harv. L. Rev. 1113; MJ. Graetz,

"Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax' (1979) 92 Harv. L Rev. 1575.
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sharing function of a corporate cash flow tax
could be combined
13
with the withholding function of integration.
6. American Law Institute federal income tax project
In 1982, a study published by the American Law Institute
suggested enactment of a corporate deduction for dividends paid,
with the deduction limited to dividends earned on amounts
contributed to corporate enterprises after the date of enactment
("new equity").14 The deductible amount would be further limited
to a specified rate, similar to the return on corporate debt. This
proposal was intended, like integration, to avoid the double tax on
the return to corporate equity, but without a windfall gain to current
shareholders, the price of whose shares presumably reflects the
anticipated corporate tax on assets already in corporate solution
("old equity"). Because the deduction for returns to new equity
would be limited to a specified rate, this proposal can also be
interpreted as an attempt to reach profits on new corporate
investments in excess of that rate, with an effect similar to that of
a cash-flow tax.
B. Implementation of the Models
Although these models provide conceptual guidelines for
designing corporate tax systems, the models are generally not fully
implemented in particular national systems. Canada, for example,
adopted a form of partial shareholder-credit integration after the
Carter Commission Report, but the system as enacted does not

13 For example, R.W. Boadway, N. Bruce, J.M. Mintz, "The Role and Design of the
Corporate Income Tax' (1984) 86 Scand. J. of Econ. 286.
14 American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Projec Subchapter C:

Proposals on

Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions, and Reporter's Study on Corporate Distributions

(Philadelphia, Pa.: ALI, 1982) at 356-400. This volume contains both the Institute's proposals
regarding corporate acquisitions [hereinafter ALI Acquisition Proposals] and its Reporter's
study regarding corporate distributions [hereinafter ALl Reporter's Study]. Only the former
carry the imprimatur of the Institute.
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always accomplish integration.1 5 Indeed, shareholders can under
certain circumstances obtain credits for taxes that have not been
collected from the distributing corporation, a phenomenon
sometimes known as "superintegration. ' 16 Many other developed
nations have also adopted a partial form of integration in recent
years, usually opting for the shareholder-credit method, in part 1to7
preserve taxation of corporate income paid to foreign shareholders.
In the United States, the full rigours of the classical system
of double taxation could be mitigated in a variety of ways before the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, including the conduct of business through
partnerships or special categories of corporations.1 8 When business
was conducted in regular corporate form, the burden of the
corporate tax could be reduced by supplying capital as debt or
leased property. In addition, a 1935 Supreme Court decision,
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,1 9 had come to mean
that corporations were not taxed on the previously unrealized
appreciation on corporate assets when those assets were distributed
to shareholders, creating another opportunity to avoid one level of
tax. Even when two taxes were collected, the shareholder tax could
be substantially reduced if the distribution of corporate earnings was
accomplished in a transaction, such as repurchase of shares by the
corporation, that gave rise to a capital gain, which was taxed
substantially less heavily than ordinary income.20 The effective tax
15 Income
Tax Act, S.C. 1971, c. 63, ss 82, 121.
16 See, for example, D.P. Jones, "Corporations, Double Taxation, and the Theory of
Integration" (1979) 27 Can. Tax. J. 405; D.P. Jones, "Further Reflections on Integration: The
Modified Small Business Deduction, Nonqualifying Businesses, Specified Investment Income,
Corporate Partnerships, and Personal Service Corporations" (1982) 30 Can. Tax J. 1; G. Bale,
"A Call for Fundamental Tax Reform from the U.S. Treasury: Some Implications for Canada"
(1985) 33 Can. Tax J. 269 at 287-96.
17 See generally, International Fiscal Association, Imputation Systems - Objectives and
Consequences (Deventer. Kluwer, 1983).
18 See supra, notes 6 and 7.
19 296 U.S. 200 (1935).

20 Internal Revenue Code, supra, note 6 as am., § 1202 (providing for a 60 percent
deduction of net long term capital gains prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
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rate on certain new capital investments could also be substantially
reduced by the capital recovery provisions, which made available
deductions and credits with a present value equal to expensing, the
standard result under cash flow taxation.2 1 Finally, the highest
corporate tax rate was historically lower than the highest individual
tax rate, so that the "double" tax could often be advantageous for
taxpayers, because earnings could compound in corporate solution at
a higher after-tax rate of return than they would in the hands of
individual shareholders.
In addition to a complex set of rules and distinctions
governing distributions of corporate income to shareholders, U.S.
corporate tax law prior to 1987 had developed a highly articulated
system governing corporate mergers and other re-organizations. In
general, the statute, cases, and rulings attempted to distinguish
between taxable sales and non-taxable reorganizations on the basis
of continuity of investment. 22 The basic idea was that corporations
and shareholders should be taxed where there was a change in the
substance, but not the form, of their investment. These provisions
were often criticized for their awesome complexity.2 3 In addition,
some observers argued that shareholder taxability should not depend
on the same criteria as corporate taxability and that the corporatelevel results were often effectively elective for sophisticated
practitioners. 24 Finally, a troublesome, unsettled issue of statutory

21 See Meade Committee Report, supra, note 11; A-C. Warren, Jr., "Accelerated Capital
Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage" (1985) 38 Tax Law. 549.

22 See generally, M.A. Levin & M.D. Ginsburg, 'Taxing Corporate Acquisitions A Summary of the Agonizingly Complex State of Current Law" in American Bar Association
Tax Section and New York Bar State Association Tax Section, Proceedingsof a Conference son
Subchapter C (forthcoming, 1987) [hereinafter Subchapter C Conference Proceedings].
23 INd
24 See the discussion infra at 336.
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carryforwards
design was the extent to which net operating loss
25
should be transferable in mergers and acquisitions.
In general, the U.S. implemented the double tax model for
U.S. corporations on a worldwide basis with a credit for foreign
taxes paid 6 The separate corporate identity of subsidiaries was
generally respected for these purposes, making the income of foreign
branches of U.S. companies taxable in the year earned, while
until
deferring taxation of the income of foreign subsidiaries
27
repatriated to the subsidiary's U.S. parent company.
III. EFFECTS OF 1986 TAX REFORM ON U.S. CORPORATE
INCOME TAX STRUCTURE
We now turn to the effects of the 1986 legislation on the
relationship between individual and corporate income taxes in the
United States. After briefly reviewing the most important changes,
some of the corporate tax design issues implicated by those changes
will be considered in detail.
A. Major ChangesAffecting the Relationship between Corporate and
Individual Income Taxes
Three aspects of the 1986 legislation will have a major
impact on the tax consequences of corporate distributions. First,
Congress repealed the General Utilities doctrine, assuring that the
corporate tax will apply to distributions of appreciated corporate

25Congress had adopted new limitations in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, but those
limitations were widely criticized and replaced with new provisions in the Tax Reform Act of
1976, which were, in turn, controversial and never went into effect. See U.S. InternalRevenue

Code, supra, note 6 at § 382 (as enacted in 1954 and amended in 1976).
26 IRC, supra, note 6 at §§ 901-906.
27

Ibid at §902 provides a credit for foreign taxes paid by the subsidiary with respect to
repatriated earnings. See note 94, infra, for provisions limiting the availability of deferral.
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assets. 8 Implementation of this change was deferred until 1989 for
certain closely-held corporations worth less than $5 million. 29
Second, the preferential treatment of capital gains was
eliminated3 ° After the change is fully effective, the only advantage
of a capital gain over ordinary income is that the former can be
used to fully offset capital losses, whereas only $3000 of ordinary
income can be offset by capital losses annually.31 Continuation of
limited deductibility for capital losses prevents taxpayers from
realizing their capital losses in order to reduce taxes on ordinary
income, while retaining assets on which there is unrealized capital
gain.
Third, the historic relationship between individual and
corporate tax rates was reversed, so that, when fully phased in, the
maximum corporate rate will be 34 percent and the maximum
shareholder rate will be 28 percent.32 Immediately before the
legislation, the maximum corporate rate was 46 percent, and the
Before 1981, the
maximum individual rate was 50 percent.
maximum corporate rate was 48 percent, and the maximum
individual rate was 70 percent.
The only major structural change enacted with respect to
corporate mergers and other reorganizations was the adoption of a
new set of limitations on net operating loss carryforwards.3 3 After
a significant shift in stock ownership, annual deductions for loss
carryforwards by the corporation will now be limited to the value of
the corporation before the change in ownership multiplied by a
long-term tax-exempt rate of return. This limitation is intended to

28Ibid at §§ 311, 336.
29 Tax Reform Act of 1986 H.R. 3838, 99th Congress, 2nd session §633(d).

The

transitional relief is phased out for corporations worth between $5 million and $10 million.
30

IRC, supra, note 6 at § 1202.

31 Ibd § 1211. The excess can be carried forward indefinitely. Ibid at § 1212.
32 Ibid at §§ 1, 11. Lower rates and certain other tax benefits are phased out as income
rises, so that the total marginal rate of tax may be higher during the phase-out.

33 Ibid at § 382.
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restrict use of the loss carryforwards to approximately the income
that could have been generated by the corporation without a change
in ownership. 34
The major 1986 innovation regarding international corporate
income was the imposition of a Canadian-type branch profits tax on
U.S. branches of foreign companies in addition to the regular
income tax.35 The rationale for the additional tax is that the double
U.S. tax applicable to corporate subsidiaries of foreign companies
(which are taxed once when income is earned, and again when
dividends are paid), should also apply to foreign
companies
36
branches.
through
States
United
the
in
operating
B. Current Issues in Corporate Tax Design
The 1986 legislation raises issues for corporate tax design in
four major areas: (1) the scope of the corporate tax base, (2) the
treatment of shareholders on receipt of corporate distributions, (3)
mergers, acquisitions, and liquidations, and (4) international income
flows.
1. Scope of the Corporate Tax Base
The reversal of the historic rate relationship between
individual and corporate taxes, the elimination of the General
Utilities doctrine, and the repeal of the capital gains preference have
substantially increased the tax cost of doing business in corporate
form in the United States. As a result, the months since adoption
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have been characterized by intensive
activity and discussion by tax practitioners focused on minimizing the
double tax by removing assets from corporate solution. As a result,
some practitioners have issued dire warnings about the coming

U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, GeneralEplanation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987) 295-96. These limitations
derived from the ALIAcquisition Proposals,supra, note 14 at 237-90.

35 IRC, supra, note 6 at § 884. Cf. Income TaxAct, supra, note 15 at Part XIV.
36 General Eplanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra, note 34 at 1036-38.
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"disincorporation" of America. 7 Three basic techniques are
involved.
First, increased use may be made of forms of business
organization that are not subject to the corporate tax. In particular,
large publicly-traded partnerships, known as "master limited
partnerships," are now pushing the limits of the extent to which an
entity can display corporate attributes without being characterized as
a corporation for tax purposes 8 Similarly, many closely-held
American businesses have, or will, elect to be taxed under
subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, which passes through
currently and does not impose a
taxable income to the shareholders
39
separate corporate income tax.
Second, corporations that cannot make use of the
partnership or subchapter S provisions can effectively reduce the size
of the corporate tax base by substituting debt for equity in their
capital structures, so that corporate income is distributed in the form
of deductible interest, rather than nondeductible dividends. In the
simplest form of transaction, a corporation might borrow funds, after
which it would purchase its own shares on the stock market. A
more sophisticated transaction is the "leveraged buy-out" which has
attained great popularity in recent years as a means of taking public
companies private. Such buy-outs typically result in a highly
leveraged capital structure and a substantially reduced tax base.
Similarly, corporate acquisitions that are not intended to take a
public company private have sometimes used high-interest-rate "junk
bond" financing, which generates interest deductions in lieu of the

37 See L.S. Freeman, "Some Early Strategies for the Methodological Disincorporation of
America After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Grafting Partnership Onto C Corporations,
Running Amok with the Master Limited Partnership Concept, and Generally Endeavoring to

Defeat the Intention of the Draftsmen of the Repeal of General Utilities" (1986) 64 Taxes 962;
W. Friedrich, "The Unincorporation of America" (1987) 15 J.Corp. Taxation 3; P.C. Canellos,

"Corporate Tax Integration:

By Design or By Default" in Subchapter C Conference

Proceedings, supra, note 22.

38 See Treasuy Tax Reform Study, supra, note 2 at 146-49 (proposing that large limited
partnerships be taxed as corporations.)
39 Other pass-through entities under current law include regulated investment companies,

real estate investment trusts, and real estate mortgage investment conduits. IRC, supra, note
6 at §§ 851-860G.
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dividend payments previously made to the shareholders of the target
corporation. Finally, "leveraged recapitalizations" have recently been
developed on Wall Street as a way of substituting debt for 40equity
where there is a substantial body of continuing shareholders.
Third, even where assets currently in corporate solution will
continue to bear the corporate tax, techniques are being developed
to insulate future business prospects from that tax. For example,
instead of raising capital and pursuing a business idea itself, a
corporation might enter into a joint venture with a widely-held
partnership to pursue the project.41 By using this form of business
organization, the share of business earnings directed to noncorporate partners would escape the corporate tax completely.
A number of these techniques, such as the substitution of
debt for equity, involve the complication that no tax may ever be
collected on the capital income earned through corporate enterprise,
because the supplier of capital may be a non-taxable foreign lender
or an exempt institution or pension fund.
In general, these techniques can be thought of as varieties of
do-it-yourself integration in a system that supposedly rejects the
integration model in favour of the classical double tax. Under the
current regime, some corporate income is thus subject to the double
tax, while other, arguably corporate income is subject to effective
integration, perhaps with non-taxable suppliers of capital. Most of
the opportunities described above are not new, but the 1986
legislation increased the incentive to avoid the corporate tax.
Additional taxpayer activity along these lines will presumably require
a clearer articulation of when the classical double tax will apply. In
particular, Congress or the Treasury will have to decide whether
publicly-traded partnerships are to be classified as corporations;
whether the single-tax regime of subchapter S should be expanded
or contracted; and whether interest deductions should be available
on debt substituted for equity.
Because of the pressure placed on the corporate tax base by
the 1986 reversal of the historic relationship between corporate and

40 See Canellos, supra, note 37.
41 See Freeman, supra, note 37.
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individual rates, Congress will also have to decide whether it should
restore a corporate rate that is not significantly higher than, or is
below, the maximum individual rate. If the new rate structure is
continued, consideration will have to be given to whether there is
still any need for the penalty taxes that are designed to discourage
of
the accumulation of corporate earnings and the formation
42
taxation.
individual
avoid
to
companies
personal holding
2. Taxation of distributions to shareholders
A second area in which the 1986 legislation dramatically
changed the federal income tax stakes involves the taxation of
shareholders on the distribution of corporate earnings. Before 1987,
a dividend received was ordinarily income if the distributing
corporation had current or accumulated earnings and profits,
historically a measure of corporate earnings.4 3 If, on the other
hand, earnings were distributed by means of a corporation
repurchasing its shares, and the repurchase was not re-characterized
as a dividend,44 the selling shareholders would be taxed on the
excess of the amount received over their cost basis,45 with that
excess usually eligible for capital gains treatment. Such distributions
of corporate earnings at capital gains rates were generally known by
the colourful name of "bail-outs". This advantageous treatment was
available not only for redemptions, as the Internal Revenue Code
styles share repurchases, but also for qualifying complete and partial
purchases by corporations of shares from
liquidations and for certain
46
individual stockholders.

42 IRC, supra, note 6 at §§ 531, 541.
43 Ibid. at §§ 301, 312, 316.

44 The basic test for dividend equivalence involves an inquiry into whether shareholders
have experienced a diminution in their proportionate interest in the corporation, on the theory
that dividends are typically pro rata. See ibid. § 302(b).
45 Ibid. at § 1001.
46 Ibid. at § 331 (complete liquidations), § 302(b)(4) (partial liquidations). IRC § 304
provides that purchases of stock by a related corporation may be re-characterized as dividends.
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Similarly, certain stock dividends would not be taxed
currently, but could give rise to capital gains on a later sale or other
disposition.4 7 Certain spin-offs of the stock of corporate subsidiaries
to shareholders of a parent corporation would also not cause
immediate shareholder taxation, but would benefit from capital gains
treatment when those shares were later sold.48 To complete the
treatment of sales of corporate stock, the "collapsible corporation"
provisions would convert the usual capital gain on sale or liquidation
or corporate shares into ordinary income where corporate-level
realization was avoided. 49
This array of provisions can be generalized with the
statement that the Internal Revenue Code distinguished between
dividend and non-dividend distributions of corporate earnings in
three significant ways before the Tax Reform Act of 1986. First, a
dividend was generally fully taxed as ordinary income, while a nondividend distribution might benefit from the capital gains preference.
Second, dividends and non-dividend distributions had different
measuring rods for the recovery of capital that is necessary to
identify income in the sense of gain. Dividends required corporate
earnings and profits, whereas non-dividend distributions were
generally taxed if the amount realized exceeded shareholder basis.
Third, because dividends are typically pro rata, all shareholders
would generally be taxed on dividends; whereas in non-dividend
distributions only shareholders receiving cash or other property
would be taxed. For example, the repurchase of stock by a
corporation from some of its shareholders would have no tax
consequences for non-selling shareholders, even though the

47 Ibid. at § 305(a) provides that certain stock dividends are non-taxable, but there are

a number of exceptions. For example, IRC § 305(b) may require current taxation of stock
dividends when other shareholders receive something else of value. 1RC § 305(c) provides the
Treasury with authority to extend that treatment to other transactions involving changes in
shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation. IRC § 306 taints certain preferred
stock dividends, so that they will be denied capital gains treatment on later sale or disposition.
48 Ibid at § 355 generally conditions non-taxability on the distribution of control, the
presence of active businesses in the distributing and distributed companies, and the absence
of a device to distribute earnings and profits.

49 Ibid at § 341.
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redemption could be re-characterized as a dividend to all
shareholders followed by sales of stock among those shareholders.5 0
The 1986 Act changed the stakes dramatically for the
distinction between dividend and non-dividend distributions of
corporate earnings, by eliminating the preferential treatment of
capital gains. The current regime is unnecessarily complicated and
sometimes requires distinctions that no longer matter. Accordingly,
just as the 1986 changes and the taxpayer response to them require
refinement of the scope of the corporate tax base, so those changes
suggest that further refinement of the provisions for taxing
shareholder distributions is in order.
There are at least three possible responses to the current
situation regarding distributions. First, one might take the view that
repeal of the capital gains preference is not necessarily stable; so
that the existing regime should be left in place because it would
have to be reintroduced if the capital gains preference were
restored 5 1
A second response is that redesign of the corporate tax
should take advantage of capital gains repeal to simplify the taxation
of distribution. In this view, the main pre-1986 difference in
treatment between dividends and non-dividend distributions was the
possibility of capital gains status for the latter.
The other
differences could be reduced by repealing the earnings-and-profits
concept for domestic purposes and adopting a uniform method of
recovering shareholder basis that would apply to all forms of
corporate distribution.5 2 The post-1986 function of the capital gains
concept in limiting the category of income against which capital
losses can be fully deducted could be more directly accomplished by

50 M.A. Chirelstein, "Optional Redemptions and Optimal Dividends:

Taxing the

Repurchase of Common Shares" (1969) 78 Yale L.J. 739.
51 Even on this view, however, the collapsible corporation provisions could be eliminated
if the target of those provisions was thought to be avoidance of the corporate tax by taking
advantage of the General Utilities doctrine.
52 The earnings and profits concept has long been criticized. See, for example, W.D.
Andrews, "'Out of its Earnings and Profits': Some Reflections on the Taxation of Dividends"
(1956 Harv. L. Rev. 1403; WJ.Blum, 'The Earnings and Profits Limitation on Dividend
Income: A Reappraisal" (1975) 53 Taxes 68.
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limiting the deductibility of losses to a narrower category of gains,
such as those on publicly-traded assets.53 Finally, in the interest of
simplicity, this approach would ignore the remaining difference
between dividend and non-dividend distributions - that all
shareholders are usually taxed on dividend distributions, whereas
non-dividend distributions result in the taxation of only those
shareholders who receive cash or other property.
The third, and final, possible response to repeal of the
capital gains preference attacks this remaining difference. The
premise of this third approach is that corporations should not be
able to distribute their earnings at a substantially reduced tax cost by
replacing dividends with non-dividend distributions, even after the
elimination of the capital gains preference. The resulting tax cost
would be especially reduced if the only shareholders electing to be
taxed by, for example, selling stock back to the corporation are
those who are effectively non-taxable, either by status or because
54
shareholder basis has been stepped-up by a testamentary transfer.
If the opportunity to avoid taxation by not taking cash or
property in a non-dividend distribution is considered significant, how
could the corporate tax be redesigned to eliminate or reduce that
possibility? There are at least two choices. First, the existing
modest statutory provisions that impute dividend treatment to
shareholders who experience an increase in their proportionate
interest in the corporation could be expanded.55 Alternatively, the
American Law Institute study mentioned earlier proposed that a
special excise tax be collected from any corporation making a nondividend distribution. 56 This excise is intended to compensate for
the lower tax cost of such distributions to shareholders. The scope
of this approach is perhaps broader than is at first obvious, because
See, for example, M.D. Ginsburg, "Reexamining Subchapter C: An Overview and
Some Modest Proposals to Stimulate Debate" in Subchapter C Conference Proceedings,supra,
note 22.
54 JRC, supra, note 6 at § 1014 provides that the basis of an asset received from a
decedent is its value as of the decedent's death.

55 Ibid at § 305(c).
56

ALI Reporter's Study, supra, note 14 at 401-86.
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the purchase by corporation A of unrelated corporation B's stock
from individual shareholders is, in effect, a non-dividend distribution
by corporation A to individual shareholders. Accordingly, full
implementation of this approach would require application of the
excise tax5 7 to corporate purchases of stock from unrelated
individuals.
To recapitulate, repeal of the capital gains preference
dramatically changes the stakes in the taxation of corporate
distributions to shareholders. If that repeal is thought likely to be
permanent, the distinction between dividends and non-dividend
distributions could be greatly simplified by reducing the remaining
differences in tax cost for the various methods of distributing
corporate earnings to shareholders. Complete elimination of those
differences would, however, require adoption of the excise tax or
something like it.
3. Mergers, acquisitions, and liquidations
Another area that is ripe for legislative change is the set of
provisions concerning corporate mergers, acquisitions, and
liquidations. The Internal Revenue Code has long drawn a basic
distinction between sales, which are taxable events, and corporate
reorganizations, which are non-taxable for both shareholders and
corporations5 8 The distinction derives from the realization concept
and is clear at the extremes. For example, sale of corporate assets
or stock for cash has been considered a significant enough change
in position to impose income taxation on the selling party.59 On the
other hand, merger of one company into another with the
shareholders of the merged company receiving only stock of the
surviving company has not been thought to involve the kind of
change in position generally required for taxation for either the

57

1bid at 473. For small investments in corporate stock, a roughly comparable result
could be achieved by denying the intercorporate dividend exclusion with respect to such stock.
Aid- at 487-513.
58

1RC, supra note 6, §§ 354, 358, 368, 361, 362.

59 Id at § 1001.
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Although the

distinction is clear in extreme cases, its implementation in the
United States has required a maddingly complicated statute,61 a
variety of additional judicial requirements (such as a continuity of
propriety interest, business purpose, and continuity of business
enterprise) for reorganization status, 62 and a massive volume of
judicial decisions and administrative rulings to enforce the oftrepeated proposition that the substance of the transaction, not its
form, determines the tax consequences.
a) Elective corporate taxation of acquisitions
In 1982, the American Law Institute proposed a fundamental
reformulation of the corporate reorganization provisions under which
the traditional realization-based approach would be replaced by
elective treatment at the corporate level. 63 Shareholder taxation
would be determined separately on the basis of the consideration
received by particular shareholders. 64 In 1985, the staff of the
Senate Finance Committee made similar proposals. 65 While this
approach was not adopted by the 1986 Act, it is very much on the
current reform agenda. The argument for its adoption involves five
steps: (i) that corporate acquisitions should be recategorized on the
basis of a functional distinction between carryover and cost-basis
acquisitions; (ii) that the current system is already effectively elective
between these two types of acquisitions in many cases; (iii) that
simplicity and the role of the corporate income tax would be served

60 kid at § 368(a)(1)(A).

61 See Levin & Ginsburg, supra, note 22.
62 See B. Wolfman, Federal Income Taxation of Business Enteiprise, 2d ed. (Boston:

Little, Brown, 1982) at 621-50.
63

ALI Acquisition Proposals,supra, note 14 at 22-150.

64 bikd at 151-97.
65 U.S. Congress, 99th Sess., 1st Sess., Staff of the Senate Committee on Finance, The
Subchapter C Revision Act of 1985 (S. Prt. 99-47, 1985) [hereinafter Senate Staff Proposals].
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by making the election explicit; (iv) that although certain
discontinuities addressed by this approach were eliminated by the
1986 Act, others were created; and (v) that the design implications
of the election are more acceptable than the alternatives.
(i) Carryover- versus cost-basis acquisitions
The 1982 American Law Institute recommendations suggest
that the controlling legal concepts be formulated not in terms of the
traditional distinction between sales and reorganizations, but in terms
of a more functional distinction between two kinds of corporate
acquisitions said to be implicit in current law: first, carryover-basis
transactions in which the transferor of corporate assets is not taxed,
and the acquiring corporation takes a carryover basis in the acquired
assets, and second, cost-basis transactions in which the transferor of
corporate assets is taxed, and the acquiring corporation takes a cost
basis in the acquired assets.
This distinction does not depend on the consideration
transferred by the acquiring corporation, nor on the form of the
corporate transaction. Thus, acquisitions of either corporate assets
or stock, paid for with either cash or stock of the acquiring company
could be either carryover-basis or cost-basis transactions at the
election of the taxpayers, as long as the corporate parties reported
the acquisitions consistently.
(ii) Effective electivity
The next step in the argument is that the current system is
already effectively elective between carryover-basis and cost-basis
acquisitions in many cases. As a consequence of the repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine, stock purchases for cash are currently
subject to explicitly elective treatment. 66 Hence, an acquiring
corporation can purchase the stock of a target corporation for cash
and, if nothing more is done, the target's basis in its assets will
remain unchanged and the target will pay no taxes. If, on the other
hand, the acquiring corporation so elects, it can step up the target's
66 1RC, supra, note 6 at § 338.
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basis in its assets as long as the target corporation recognizes gain
as if it had sold those assets. 67 Stock acquisitions made with stock
of the acquiring corporation can achieve carryover-basis treatment
under the reorganization provisions;68 cost-basis treatment of such
acquisitions can be obtained if the requirements of a reorganization
are not satisfied.
Asset purchases for cash will result in taxation of the selling
(target) company and a cost basis for the purchasing corporation if
no further action is taken. Carryover-basis asset acquisitions for
cash require several transactional steps, such as the acquiring
corporation buying stock of the target and then liquidating the
target to receive its assets with the target's previous basis. 69 Asset
acquisitions with stock of the acquiring corporation can achieve
carryover-basis treatment under the reorganization provisions; 70 costbasis treatment of such acquisitions can be obtained if the
requirements of a reorganization are not satisfied.
The argument is not that sophisticated tax practitioners can
necessarily accomplish every result desired by corporate parties, but
that every desired result can be accomplished by some form of
corporate transaction. There may, however, be valid non-tax reasons
for not adopting a particular transactional form, so some results may
be precluded for legitimate business reasons. For example, the

67 The cost-basis election was introduced in 1982 and replaced the previous requirement
that the acquiring company liquidate the newly acquired subsidiary to receive a cost basis in
the target's assets. Internal Revenue Code, supra, note 6 at § 334(b)(2). The statutory
opportunity to take a cost basis in the target corporation's assets after a stock acquisition,
either by liquidation or election, derives from the availability of a cost basis if the assets of
the target are purchased either from the target or from the target's shareholders after the
shareholders have liquidated the target. Before this opportunity was made available by statute,
the courts had to distinguish acquisitions in which the acquiring corporation sought the target's
assets from those in which the acquiring corporation sought the target's stock. The former
would giver rise to a cost basis in the target's assets, while the latter would yield a carryover
basis. See, for example, Kimbell-DiamondMilling Co. v. Commissioner (1950), 14 T.C. 74.
68 For example, IRC, supra, note 6 at § 368(a)(1)(A)&(B).
69 Ibid at § 332 provides that liquidation of a controlled subsidiary is non-taxable to the
parent corporation; /RC § 337 provides that it is non-taxable to the subsidiary; and IRC §
334(b) provides that the parent takes the subsidiary's basis in the transferred assets.
70 For example, ibid at § 368(a)(1)(C).
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carryover-basis asset acquisition described in the last paragraph
requires the acquiring corporation either to exchange its stock for
the desired assets or to take the target corporation's environmental
and other liabilities, as a result of the target's liquidation. The
argument for elective treatment on this view of current law is that
making the election between carryover-basis and cost-basis
acquisitions explicit would both simplify the taxation of acquisitions
and separate the tax consequences from the availability of various
corporate procedures.
(iii) Role of the corporate tax
The view that taxpayers should be able to freely elect costor carryover-basis treatment, no matter whether the transaction
would be classified as a sale or a reorganization under current law,
is related to conceiving of the corporate tax as having two
functions. 71 First, it implements the double tax on the current
operating income of corporations. Second, it functions as a
substitute tax on non-operating income of corporations when that
income is not taxed currently to shareholders. This refinement of
the classical view of the corporate tax suggests that the double tax
need not apply to the realization of gain on corporate assets outside
the usual course of business if shareholders are currently taxed.
Allowing corporate acquisitions to achieve either carryoverbasis or cost-basis treatment is consistent with this view of the
corporate tax, as long as a corporation transferring assets in a carryover basis asset acquisition cannot retain the consideration received
for the assets in order to avoid current shareholder taxation.
Accordingly, the proposals generally limit the availability of an
election for carryover-basis treatment of two types of asset
acquisitions: (1) mergers or consolidations that do not involve
consideration that would be taxable if distributed to shareholders;
and (2) asset acquisitions in which the corporation transferring the
assets distributes the consideration received for the assets to its

71 ALl Acquisition Proposals,supra, note 14 at 15-19.
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shareholders in a taxable transaction. 72 Thus, in every cash
acquisition of assets there would be at least one tax collected: from
the shareholders of the selling corporation if the cash is distributed
to them, and from the selling corporation if it is not so distributed.
(iv) Discontinuities
Before the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, the
acquiring corporation could obtain a cost basis without any
correlative taxation of the transferring corporation. 73
This
discontinuity was one of the principal defects of General Utilities for
many of its opponents. 74 The 1986 repeal eliminated that possibility,
but introduced some additional discontinuities. Consider, first, the
sale of stock by individual shareholders to an acquiring company
versus the sale of corporate assets to that company. As described
above, the Code currently allows explicitly elective treatment on
stock, but not asset, acquisitions.7s
Now consider the sale by a corporate parent of stock in a
wholly-owned subsidiary. If the corporate parent sells the subsidiary
stock to an acquiring corporation for cash and distributes the
proceeds to the corporate parent's individual shareholders, there will
be a corporate tax due on the sale, but the acquiring corporation
will not receive a correlative step-up in corporate asset basis unless
gain is recognized on the subsidiary's assets. 76 That is, carryoverbasis treatment is not available even though individual shareholders
of the selling corporation pay a current tax. Under these

72

ALIAcquition Proposals,ibid at 73-74; Senate Staff Proposals,supra, note 65 at 50.

73 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 338 of the InternalRevenue Code provided that
the target was taxed as though it had sold its assets pursuant to a plan of liquidation, but such
sales were generally not taxable. See Internal Revenue Code, supra, note 6 at § 337 (as
amended prior to 1986).
74 Senate Staff Proposals,supra, note 65 at 42-44, 59-61.
75

1RC, supra, note 6 at § 338.

76 Ibid § 338(h)(10) provides a special election to have the gain recognized on the

subsidiary's assets, rather than on the sale of the subsidiary stock.
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circumstances, the parties may be subject to "triple" taxation, because
another corporate tax will be levied if the acquired subsidiary sells
its assets. This problem derives from the possibility that a
corporation's basis in the stock of a subsidiary can differ from the
subsidiary's basis in its assets.
There are some tax-planning responses to these
discontinuities, but their validity is uncertain. 77 In addition, these
discontinuities may put further pressure on the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code that are designed to distinguish taxable
dividends from non-taxable corporate divisions. 78 For example,
corporate assets could be transferred to a subsidiary, the stock of
which is transferred to individual shareholders, who would later sell
the subsidiary stock for cash to an acquiring corporation, which
liquidates the acquired subsidiary. If the form of that transaction
were respected, the purchasing corporation would have achieved a
carryover-basis asset acquisition with only one tax, paid by selling
shareholders. Such a series of steps would, however, have to run
the gamut of provisions designed to re-characterize
transactions that
79
are essentially substitutes for dividends.
(v) Implications for corporate tax design
There are three possible statutory responses to the
discontinuities between asset and stock acquisitions under current
law: (1) adoption of the American Law Institute and Senate
Finance Committee staff proposals to extend elective treatment to
asset acquisitions, (2) elimination of the election currently available
in stock acquisitions, and (3) tolerance of the inconsistency between
asset and stock acquisitions. Each of these alternatives requires the
articulation of distinctions that may not easily be implemented.
The first response, adoption of elective treatment for asset
acquisitions, is consistent with the refined classical view of the

77 See, for example, J.A. Baker III, "Letter" (1986) 33 Tax Notes 1073.

78 IRC, supra, note 6 at § 355.
79
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corporate income tax described above in (iii), but would involve a
number of new concepts. To begin with, acquisitions eligible for the
election would have to be defined. In general, the American Law
Institute and Senate Finance Committee staff proposals are
applicable to stock acquisitions in which 80 percent of the target's
stock is obtained, and to asset acquisitions involving either statutory
mergers or the transfer of substantially all the assets of the target
corporation, followed by a liquidation of the target.80
The most difficult design issue in implementing this general
approach would be specification of when the election is available on
acquisitions of less than all the assets of a corporation or affiliated
group of corporations.81 At one extreme, transfer of any asset,
other than sale of an item of inventory in the ordinary course of
business, could be subject to the election if the selling corporation
distributed the sale proceeds to shareholders, on the ground that the
asset could have been separately incorporated and that the
articulated role of the corporate tax would be served because
shareholders would be taxed currently. Alternatively, a transfer of
substantially all the assets of a corporation or an affiliated group, or
perhaps the transfer of a pre-existing subsidiary, might be required.
Another, intermediate, solution would be to require the transfer of
an active business, as is now necessary for non-recognition treatment
of corporate divisions.8 2 Once the scope of the election was
determined, a correlative decision would be required on whether
consistency rules for corporate transferors or transferees would be
83
necessary to protect the election from expansion by tax planning.
Sometimes it is suggested that there should be special
elections available for land, goodwill, and other non-amortizable
intangibles, because a cost basis would not provide the acquiring
corporation with additional depreciation deductions even though the
80

ALIAcquisition Proposals,supra, note 14 at 43, 73-74, 145-46; Senate Staff Proposals,

supra, note 65 at 50.
81 ALI Acquisition Proposals,ibid at 92-101.
82 IRC, supra, note 6 at § 355.
83 Cf ibid at § 338(t) (consistency provisions applicable to stock acquisitions under
current law).
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corporate seller is taxed 8 4 Thus, a carryover-basis treatment might
be permitted for transfers of goodwill in a transaction otherwise
considered a cost-basis acquisition.
Finally, proposals for elective treatment would generally
conform a corporation's basis in the stock of its subsidiary to the
subsidiary's basis in its assets,85 but a special problem arises on a
carryover-basis stock acquisition, followed by resale of the acquired
subsidiary's stock within a relatively short time. Arguably, the
corporate parent should be able to compute gain or loss using the
cost of the stock for at least some limited period. Otherwise, there
might be another corporate tax due where there was no additional
economic gain.
The second response to the inconsistency in current law
between asset and stock acquisitions is to achieve consistency with
the result in asset transfers by requiring taxation at the corporate
level when there is a significant transfer of stock to an acquiring
corporation.86 The rationale for this result is that a significant
transfer of corporate assets should be a taxable event at the
corporate level, whether accomplished by acquisition of the target
company's assets or its stock. The main implementation issue
implicated by this approach is to define when there is a significant
87
enough shift in share ownership to trigger corporate taxation.
The third, and final, possible response is to tolerate
inconsistent treatment of stock and asset acquisitions by continuing
the election for cost-basis or carryover-basis stock acquisitions
without extending the election to asset acquisitions. The rationale
for this result would be that acquisition of the assets of a corporate
business should be considered a corporate realization event under
the classical system even if acquisition of a corporation's stock is
84

ALIAcquisitions Proposals,supra, note 14 at 120-33; Senate Staff Proposals,supra note

65 at 54-55.
85

ALl Acquisition Proposals,ibid.; Senate Staff Proposals, ibid. at 54-55.

86 In terms of the structure of current law, this would require a mandatory election under
IRC, supra, note 6 at § 338.
87 Cf., ibid at § 382(g) (defining shifts of stock ownership for purposes limiting loss
carryforwards).
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not. The major design issue under this approach
would be to
88
distinguish between stock and asset acquisitions.
b) Other merger, acquisition, and liquidation issues
Although the proposal for elective treatment of asset
acquisition has been the most widely discussed potential change in
this area, there are other important issues to be resolved with
respect to mergers and acquisitions. Four will be briefly identified
here.
(i) Shareholder taxation
Should the criteria for taxation of a particular shareholder be
developed separately from those governing corporate treatment and
the treatment of other shareholders, as suggested by the American
Law Institute and the Senate Finance Committee staff? Nontaxability of shareholders under these proposals would8 9 depend
strictly on the consideration received by that shareholder.
(ii) Refinement of the current regime
If the elective approach for corporate taxation is rejected
and the basic distinction in current law between taxable sales and
non-taxable reorganizations is maintained, could the governing
provisions be substantially simplified by reducing the discontinuities
among different types of reorganizations? 90

88 Cf. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (sale of assets); United
States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950) (sale of stock).
89

ALIAcquisition Proposals,supra, note 14 at 151-97; Senate Staff Proposals,supra, note
65 at 52-53.
90 See, for example, American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Committee on
Corporate Stockholder Relationships, "Recommendation No. 1981-5" (1981) 34 Tax Law 1386.
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(iii) Incorporation provisions
In recent years, taxpayers have attempted to achieve nonrecognition treatment in some acquisitions that would be taxable
under reorganization concepts by arguing that the non-recognition
provisions dealing with incorporation transactions can also be applied
to mergers and acquisitions. 91 A design decision will thus be
required on how the reorganization and incorporation provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code should be interrelated.
(iv) Net operating loss carryforwards
Finally, as described above,9 2 the 1986 legislation includes a
new set of limitations on loss carryforwards, designed to limit the
value of such carryforwards after a merger or acquisition to the
value that the losses would have had to the company transferring
the losses. The extent to which those proposals will accomplish that
goal in practice, and whether the goal is desirable, remain open
questions.
4. International issues
The 1986 rate reduction is also likely to lead to
reconsideration of certain aspects of the U.S. regime for taxing
international income flows.
International issues have not yet
received the same attention as those involving the scope of the
corporate tax base, distributions, and acquisitions, 93 so we will simply
identify the major questions that have to be addressed.

91 See, for example, Rev. Rul. 84-71, 1984 C.b. 106 (reconsidering previous ruling that
incorporation provisions were inapplicable in certain acquisitive transactions).
92 See text at 316-17.
93 United States Treasury Department, Outline of Issues for the Treawy Study of
Subchapter C (9 April 1987) indicates that the Treasury will give substantial consideration to
international issues.
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a) U.S. investment abroad
Domestic rate reduction and repeal of the capital gains
preference raise three major issues. First, should the United States
reconsider its traditional systems of taxing worldwide corporate
income with a credit for foreign taxes paid, because U.S. rates are
now lower than those imposed by many of its trading partners?
Alternatives include an exemption for foreign income and a
deduction for foreign taxes.
Second, should the distinction in the treatment of a U.S.
company's foreign branches (income taxed currently) and foreign
subsidiaries (income not taxed until repatriated) be reconsidered?
If the current system of deferral remains in place, there will certainly
be scrutiny of the provisions designed to limit opportunities for
deferral. 94
Third, reconsideration of the earnings-and-profits concept will
necessarily include the special function of that concept in the
international context, where it is used to measure the U.S. tax base
of foreign subsidiaries and to identify the foreign income related to
foreign taxes paid. 5
b) Foreign investment in the United States
Many countries, including the United States, impose a
withholding tax on certain categories of income, such as corporate
96
dividends, flowing out of the country to foreign investors.
Reduction of domestic tax rates raises the question of whether the
withholding rates, which were intended to approximate net taxation
on certain items of gross income, should now also be reduced. In
addition, the growth of do-it-yourself integration may lead to

For example, IRC, supra, note 6 at § 482 (reallocation of income and deductions
among related parties); IRC § 367 (relating to certain transfers in and out of the U.S.); IRC
§§ 951-964 (requiring the current taxation of the income of certain controlled foreign
corporations).
95 For example, ibid at §§ 902, 952.
96

1bid at §§ 871(a), 881, 1441, 1442.
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reconsideration of the current exemption from9 7 withholding for
certain categories of corporate interest payments.
Repeal of the capital gains preference for U.S. taxpayers
raises the question of whether the virtual exemption of foreign
investors from U.S. taxation of capital gains on stock in U.S.
corporations (other than those sufficiently related to U.S. real
estate) can be maintained. 8
Finally, current issues include whether the new branch-profits
tax will accomplish its intended goal of implementing the classical
double tax for foreign corporations operating in the United States,
and whether that goal is desirable.
C. Summary of the CurrentSituation
The current corporate tax regime in the United States can
be characterized as unstable in the areas we have considered. First,
the 1986 Act creates new pressures on the scope of the double tax,
with taxpayers likely to move aggressively to adopt do-it-yourself
integration in order to take advantage of relatively lower individual
tax rates. Second, for those corporate assets that remain subject to
the classical double tax, the current system is not designed for a
world with no capital gains preference and a corporate tax rate that
is higher than the individual rate. Third, the provisions governing
corporate reorganizations, which were not generally addressed by the
1986 legislation, contain many unresolved design issues, with some
new questions raised by the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
Fourth, the 1986 changes raise a number of questions about how the
United States taxes international corporate income.
IV FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As a result of the 1986 Act and prior proposals, the current
situation is ripe for significant changes in the U.S. corporate income
For example, ibia at § 871(h) (exemption for interest received on portfolio debt
investments).
98 Ibid. at §§ 864(b), 871(a)(2), 897.
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tax, in spite of the passage of major tax bills in 1981, 1982, 1984 and
1986. The 1986 legislation mandated a comprehensive study of
corporate taxation by the Treasury Department, which is due to
appear by the end of the 19879 The American Law Institute
Federal Income Tax Project is reappraising its 1982 proposals in the
light of the recent changes, and various professional groups have
begun their own studies.
Although the six models described at the beginning of this
paper all describe theoretically possible directions for future
legislation, four of those models - accrual taxation, current
shareholder taxation of corporate income, cash flow taxation, and
the American Law Institute study proposals on distributions - have
not as yet generated much widespread interest in the United States.
If recent Congressional action is any guide, the most likely
future direction is probably further refinement of the classical double
tax system to prevent the disintegration of the corporate tax base
predicted by some tax practitioners. With regard to the scope of
the corporate tax, that would probably mean clarification of the
taxation of publicly-traded partnerships, reconsideration of the role
of subchapter S, and, perhaps, an attempt to classify as equity any
debt issued in exchange for outstanding equity. With regard to
distributions on equity, this approach would mean elimination of at
least some of the remaining differences in the taxation of dividend
and non-dividend distributions, if full taxation of capital gains is
thought to be stable. This approach might also suggest reluctance
to adopt full electivity for corporate acquisitions, on the grounds
that corporations, like individuals, should pay taxes in accordance
with a realization concept, rather than an election. Finally, the
implications of recent Congressional action for future legislation in
the international area are less clear, although refinement of the
classical system could lead to a more rigorous implementation of the
double tax with regard to international income, perhaps reducing
opportunities for deferral.
My own preference would be for a different approach, which
would begin movement toward integration of the individual and the

Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra, note 29 at § 634. The Treasury has released an
outline of issues to be studied. See supra, note 93.
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corporate income taxes.
Pressures against that result in the
immediate future include revenue consideration and the feeling on
the part of many observers that Congress rejected the integration
alternative in 1986. On the other hand, uncertainty about the
economic effects of the double tax system, the spread of integrated
regimes in other developed countries, and whatever opportunities
remain for do-it-yourself integration after the next round of
legislation, may ultimately move the United States in the direction
of integration. In that case, the work done by the Canadian Carter
Commission more than twenty years ago will remain an important
standard against which future U.S. corporate tax legislation will be
measured.

